Dealing with questions of human life and dignity—as we often do—it’s tempting for me as an author to dive straight into some commentary pertaining to an affront on this dignity, and skip right over its very basis and meaning. But without a firm foundation in truth and fact, making bold arguments and claims isn’t all that worthwhile. Instead, it might be helpful to take a moment to ask: “What is human dignity after all, and how can we discuss its basic significance?”
Here, the best place to start is with a crash-course in “Philosophy 101”—considering the relationship between human persons and their actions. And this is easiest after we explore, for a moment, the relationship in general between “things” and their natures.
Most of the time, when answering the question, “What is [a thing],” our first impulse is to develop a definition in terms of the thing’s structure, functionality and usefulness. For instance, in response to the question, “What is a chair,” one might say: “A chair is a device used for sitting; it generally has four legs, a back, and is made of a sturdy material, like wood or metal.” In short, no other response would seem to offer so reasonable and intelligible an answer; and the same can be imagined for similar questions about tables, cars, televisions, etc.
With the addition of one simple word, though, the whole process becomes much more difficult. Imagine the question: “What is this chair?” Immediately the terms of the inquiry have dramatically changed. To define “a chair” is easy; but to define “this chair” is impossible. Of course, the particular chair fits within the definition of the universal (“chairness”), but the particularity of “this chair” (its “thisness”) is indefinable. In short, there is no definition of “this chair” or “that chair,” but only of “chair.”
This little mental exercise goes a long way in demonstrating the peculiarity of coming to terms with the value of individual, particular “things.” In the case of the chair, since defining an individual chair is not possible (or meaningful), we speak of the particular chair as an “object”—that is, as the object of our definition, and not as something ‘special’ in itself.
But the same is not true when we speak of human beings. Like chairs and tables, humans are definable as a group (e.g. “rational animals”); but unlike inanimate objects, human beings also possess a recognizable value in and of themselves—as individuals. When we name particular human beings (e.g. “James,” “John”), we denote an inherent significance that cannot be expressed using generalities or universal definitions. There is something about John that does not belong to James; and this is true even if they are identical twins.
When we speak of human dignity, we are referring precisely to this individual, particular value that belongs to a given human being. Basically, human dignity is what corresponds to a human being’s incommunicable self—that is, to his or her “thisness,” which can’t be defined in terms of quantity, structure or functionality (or by any universal term). There is something special about each human being that is inseparable from his or her very life. And this is recognizable, even from the outside, when we consider the capacity of each human being to stand in relation to other human beings as a unique, incommunicable, self-subsistent whole. Human beings—as living, human organisms—are entirely dignified in and of themselves.
We denote this particular value, or dignity, when we speak of another human being as a “person”—namely, as a “one-in-relation-to-another.” Moreover, the idea of human personhood introduces the notion of subjectivity (in contrast with objectivity). Whereas chairs and tables are the objects of our broad definitions, human persons—as individuals—are super-objects, since they transcend mere definition and are constituted primarily as unique “selves.” Furthermore, it is human beings (by virtue of the capacity for rational thought) that arrive at the definitions of “chair” or “table”; and so there is something utterly different between the two sorts of “things.”
This ability to separate human beings from their actions (or “function”) stands at the core of serious bioethical and social debate. If human beings amounted only to the sum of their parts (viz. a combination of hands, feet, noses, etc.), then we could treat them just as we treat chairs, tables and televisions; that is, we could use them to achieve certain goals and aims. But since an individual human being (i.e. the human organism) always coincides with a special sort of subjective, personal nature, such beings demand a different type of treatment—one that realizes and exalts the basic dignity at the core of human life.
Ultimately, when considering questions of human dignity and human personhood, the writers at ProLife ProPatria take seriously this charge to view each human life as inherently valuable, and unavailable to the aims of utilitarianism or materialism. And all perspectives on human dignity at PLPP are intended to further and maintain this basic truth that is arrived at by way of reasonable, philosophically serious investigation.
