Bioethical research—if it’s done well—is not only concerned with making philosophical distinctions; it is also deeply bound up with the science and biology behind definitions of important words, like “conception,” “life,” and “personhood.” Without scientific accuracy, there is no possibility for bioethics—bioethics and biology are inextricably connected.
In two recent letters to the editor of the National Catholic Register, Drs Dianne Irving and C. Ward Kischer critiqued an instance where scientific rectitude was allegedly foregone in an effort to achieve interesting bioethical commentary on the national debate surrounding the identification of the beginning of human life. According to Kischer, in the original December 14th article for the Register, written by Sue Ellen Browder, “the wrong people [were] sought after for interviews and comments,” and the paper allowed for “some profound errors and misstatements” to make it to print.
Irving and Kischer, who both write articles for LifeIssues.net, are perennial commentators on the situation of bioethical research today. And both have, on a number of occasions, pointed out a variety of un-scientific or un-scholarly approaches to bioethical research, which have helped to discredit, for some, the role and importance of bioethics as a whole.
In this particular instance, Dr Kischer states his case plainly:
"I never cease to be amazed that when I see and read about this subject: ‘When Human Life Begins’, the wrong people have been sought after for interviews and comments. Why is it that human embryologists are rarely those interviewed? Dr [Maureen] Condic is not a human embryologist. In this particular article, she makes some profound errors and misstatements."
Kischer goes on to cite the precise instances, which he finds fault with—among them, Condic’s assertion that pregnancy ought to be defined as beginning at implantation; and a few others. Kischer also takes a moment to correct Condic—from a biological point of view—on her various “misstatements”: most of all, that to define pregnancy as beginning at implantation simply ignores the scientific evidence that supports embryonic autonomy from the very point of ovular fertilization.
The personality in the Register article—Dr Condic—is a regular target for Irving as well. The scientist from the University of Utah has, apparently, been accused before of similarly vague remarks concerning the act of fertilization itself, and of a failure to distinguish between properly sexual conception and the possibility of the beginning of life due to asexual, monozygotic separation (as well as various forms of IVF and artificial reproduction that produce—without sexual conception—authentic, individual human lives).
At first glance, Kischer and Irving appear to have a strong case against Condic. But are they going overboard on making bioethics a politically correct enterprise?
While I strongly agree with both Drs Kischer and Irving, that bioethics cannot and ought not be portrayed as a worthwhile discipline if it is in any way devoid of solid, substantive scientific data, it would do us well to take a closer look at Dr Condic's remarks (in a broader context).
First of all, Dr Condic's history of solid reasoning seems to outweigh the heavy charges leveled against her by Kischer and Irving (at least for the average reader of the National Catholic Register). Even a cursory glance at her recent, 2008 Westchester Institute White Paper, "When Does Human Life Begin?" evidences a much clearer and more nuanced understanding of the reality of the beginning of human life than Kischer or Irving seem to admit in their letters. Despite the comments against her, Condic's larger hermeneutic surrounding fertilization and conception appears quite well-informed.
Understandably, Condic's position in the Register article that pregnancy ought to be defined not at conception, but only after implantation, could give rise to some serious disagreement. Even here, though, it is clear that her response does not necessarily forsake biological facts (she clearly admits that human life begins at the point of conception); rather, she seems to be aiming more at establishing a semantic nuance, sensitive to the meaning of "pregnancy" in the broader context of a woman's physical involvement with (and gestation of) an embryo.
In short, I think that Kischer and Irving are quite justified in making a bit of a fuss about the biological facts surrounding the nature of conception, and human reproduction. Kischer’s notion that biologically ambiguous statements may constitute “profound errors and misstatements” is not entirely wrong. But, while scientific exactitude is highly valuable, it cannot be pursued at the expense of philosophical accuracy. Kischer and Irving ought to remain open to the possibility of someone making such philosophical distinctions regarding the biological facts underlying the beginning of human life--distinctions and clarifications that, although they are not of themselves scientific, also do not constitute absolutely deficient or errant positions.
If bioethics has a future, that future is linked inseparably to a thorough, scholarly understanding of the science that underlies and affords the foundations of human life as we know it. If we fail to make distinctions scientifically, we are bound to fail in our distinctions philosophically. Yet science itself is not a sufficient grounding for bioethics. We can only consider to be “true” what we are given evidence for by way of empirical, reasonable investigation; and this includes philosophical truth as well as scientific. In the case of human life, empirical evidence abounds. We must be responsible enough to look seriously at it; but we must also be skillful enough to dialogue about it openly and carefully.
[N.B. This article was revised and reposted a few hours after its original publication.]
